The government shows a remarkable lack of enthusiasm for reforms to fight corruption within its ranks. We refer the Board to findings by the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) that has made recommendations28 that in great part remain ignored. They should be restated as their adoption could help reduce the toxicity of the environment in which Daphne Caruana Galizia, an anti-corruption journalist, ended up assassinated.
GRECO recommended:
- “that measures be taken to solve the legal situation of persons of trust and to limit the number of such discretionarily appointed officials to an absolute minimum, and that those who would perform top executive functions be required to comply with the highest standards of integrity, including as regards rules of conduct, conflicts of interest, declaratory obligations, and supervision by the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life.”
Parliament is currently debating a law “to solve the legal situation of persons of trust” but we fear this will be a measure in breach of Article 110 of the Constitution, effectively trying to legitimise through an illegitimate act of parliament the current system of using public sector employment to create a tax-payer-funded caste who operate in fertile ground for corruption, clientelism and the abuse of citizens’ rights. The Commissioner for Standards in Public Life has criticised the draft law and warned that it will have the result of reducing his competence of supervision and diluting further standards of integrity, the opposite of the intended effect of GRECO’s proposals.
- “that on the basis of proper risk assessments an integrity strategy be developed and implemented in respect of all pertinent categories of persons entrusted with top executive functions;
- “that i) more robust and systematic awareness-raising measures (e.g. refresher training and workshops, guidance documents, written reminders) be provided to all persons entrusted with top executive functions, at the start of their term and at regular intervals throughout their term and ii) that information about the integrity requirements for public officials and their observance is made readily available, including by posting such information on the websites of public authorities;
- “dissociating the functions of confidential advice and of enforcement by the Commissioner on Standards in Public Life, entrusting other persons or bodies with the former;
- “i) that the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act of 2008 be subject to an independent and thorough analysis and ii) that in light of the findings, additional measures be taken so that exceptions to the rule of public disclosure are interpreted and applied more specifically and narrowly;
- “to provide for the disclosure, as a rule, of governmental draft legislation and other texts of particular public interest, accompanied by an appropriate level of consultations and in that context (i) that only specific and limited exceptions to this rule are possible and clearly regulated and (ii) that the outcomes of public consultation procedures are published online in a timely and easily accessible manner;
- “that rules be laid down to govern (i) contacts between persons with top executive functions and lobbyists/third parties that seek to influence the public decision-making process and (ii) the disclosure of such contacts and the subject-matters discussed;
- “that a strategy be developed and implemented in order to increase the capacity, authority and public accountability of State institutions entrusted with regulatory and control functions in relation to the management of public resources;
- “that the system for managing conflicts of interest be supplemented with clear provisions and guidance regarding i) a requirement upon persons exercising top executive functions to disclose conflicts ad hoc and ii) clear procedures, responsibilities and deadlines for solving situations of conflict of interest, including following complaints by the public or other institutions;
- “(i) that the current provisions on incompatibilities and side-activities applicable to persons with top executive functions be made more coherent and robust for all categories of such persons, with clearer and stricter limits on permissible parallel activities, and (ii) that specific procedures, responsibilities and deadlines for solving such situations, upon ad-hoc disclosures and/or complaints by the public or other institutions be introduced;
- “that the current regime of asset and interest declaration be further developed by (i) extending to persons entrusted with top executive functions, including persons of trust who are associated with a minister’s decision-making, the duty to file a detailed declaration with the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, and considering including information on the spouses (it being understood that the latter information would not necessarily be made public), and (ii) ensuring that all declarations are made systematically, easily and publicly accessible on-line;
- “to ensure (i) that asset and interest declarations of persons entrusted with top executive functions are subject to effective and proactive checks by the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life and that the institution is therefore provided with adequate legal, human and other means and required to report publicly and regularly about its work (ii) that clear consequences and effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are applicable to guarantee the accuracy and correctness of information declared as well as the actual filing of a declaration, including the possibility to refer a matter to a criminal investigation;
- “(i) that the criminal investigation and prosecution system in relation to persons entrusted with top executive functions be reformed along the lines identified by the Venice Commission in its assessment from December 2018, giving a central active role to the prosecutors and without retaining the parallel jurisdiction of the Permanent Commission against Corruption and (ii) that it be made clear for criminal investigative bodies that the launching of an inquest or investigation can be based on reasonable suspicion and does not require that evidence is readily submitted to them;
- “that i) legislation be issued giving criminal investigation bodies the authority to seek and use special investigative techniques (such as wiretaps and other similar measures) in the investigation of corruption offences, empowering the judicial authority to authorise their use, and making the evidence obtained thereby admissible in court while respecting the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and that ii) it be made clear to all authorities involved in the investigation of corruption that the evidence lawfully obtained by such means is admissible evidence in court;
- “(i) that all persons with top executive functions be subjected, as a rule, to the supervision of the Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, who should be equipped with the appropriate means and possibilities to conduct inquiries and to propose effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, and (ii) that the jurisdiction of the commissioner extends to on-going situations even where these result from actions which predate the enactment of the Standards in Public Life Act.”
We are aware of no evidence of any government action to implement these measures with any seriousness, in spite of the fact that given the country’s experience over the last 8 years, these reforms should rightly be a matter of priority.